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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DONALD V. TOLMAN,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14,625

K-MART ENTERPRISES OF
UTAH, INC., a Utah corporation, and JEFF T. DONG,
Defendants and
Respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF TtJE CASE
This is an action for false ^rrest allegedly
occurring on November 16, 1974.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER C|OURT
The District Court granted Defendants1 Motion
for Summary Judgment based upon the Statute of Limitations,
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The granting of the Motion fo|r Summary Judgment
should be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree generally with the Statement of Facts as presented in Appellant's Brief.
Respondents submit, however, that the Statement of Facts
in Appellant's Brief is overly detailed and contains
many irrelevant factual allegations.
The operative facts of this case, briefly summarized, are as follows (all page references to the
transcript of the pretrial conference) :
1.

The plaintiff went into the Orem K-Mart

Store on November 16, 1974 (page 2).
2.

At that time he was apprehended by the

defendants for attempted shoplifting because it appeared
that he had switched some price tags on an item and had
gone to the checkout stand paying the lesser amount
(page 2 and 3, page 5).
3.

This action was initiated more than one

year thereafter, the Complaint being filed on December
15, 1975, and Summons served on December 19, 1975.

The

plaintiff's Complaint sought damages for the alleged false

2

arrest and alleged that the defendant$ "arrested Plaintiff, took him to a room in the back of the store and
falsely and maliciously detained and ijmprisoned Plaintiff and falsely brought charges agaiqst Plaintiff for
theft" (Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 6 ) ,
4.

The sole basis for Plaintiff's Complaint

was an alleged false arrest and imprisonment of the
plaintiff as is stated clearly in Plaintiff's Complaint
and as admitted by Plaintiff's counsel on page 2 of the
transcript of the pretrial proceedings.
5.

The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss

or for Summary Judgment which was treaffced by the Court
as a Motion for Summary Judgment, and (granted, it being
undisputed that the plaintiff's Complaint v/as not filed
within one year.

3

AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENT
POINT I. THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
It is undisputed that the plaintiff's Complaint
herein was not filed until more than one year after the
alleged false arrest.

The false arrest allegedly oc-

curred on November 16, 1974, and the Complaint was not
filed until December, 1975.
The plaintiff's claim, being one for false
arrest, is governed by Section 78-12-29, Utah Code Ann.
(1953), which provides for a one year Statute of Limitations in "an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or seduction" (emphasis added).
Respondents agree generally with the proposition asserted by the appellants to the effect that the
Statute of Limitations should only bar those actions
which are clearly covered thereby.
The appellants contend that the statute should
not be strained or applied in an overly strict manner,
nor should the meaning of the terms thereof be strained
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in order to bar the plaintiff's claim.

The respondents

agree with that proposition, but would remind the Court
that neither, on the other hand, should the terms of
the statute be strained in order to remove the bar to
a cause of action v/hich otherwise clearly is within the
plain language and intent of the statute.
The general rule relating to construction of
Statutes of Limitation is as set forth in Section 50 of
51 AmJur2d, Limitation of Actions, pag^ 630:

Formerly, the defense afforded by the
Statute of Limitations was not treated
with the same favor as ordinary defenses,
and being looked on with disfavor, Statutes of Limitation wete strictly construed, particularly since such statutes
are invariably in derogation of the common law. Nov/, however, the judicial
attitude is in favor of Statutes of Limitation, rather than otherwise, since
they are considered ap statutes of repose
and as affording security against stale
claims. Consequently], except in the
case of Statutes of Limitation against
the government, the Courts are inclined
to construe limitatioh laws liberally,
so as to affect the intention of the
legislature.
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The principle that Statutes of Limitation are to be liberally construed does
not mean, however, that the usual rules
of statutory construction will be ignored. The Courts will not strain
either the facts or the law in favor
of a Statute of Limitations, nor should
such a statute be extended by the
Courts or be applied to cases not clearly
within the statutory provisions. But
neither should a Court give a strained
construction in order to evade the
effect of a Statute of Limitations.

The Statute of Limitations is regarded as a statute of
repose and must be given a fair and reasonable construction and application, Gibson v. Jensen, 158 Pac. 426, 48
Utah 244.
Since the plaintiff's Complaint sounds solely
in false arrest, and it is undisputed that the Complaint
was not filed until more than one year after the cause
of action accrued, the Summary Judgment granted by the
Lower Court must be affirmed unless, as contended by
Appellant, there is a difference between the tort of
false imprisonment and false arrest.

6

POINT II. FALSE ARREST AND FALSE
IMPRISONMENT ARE THE SAME TORT.
Appellant attempts to circumvent the Statute
of Limitations by claiming that his Complaint is for
"false arrest" and that the Statute of Limitations
only applies to "false imprisonment".

The plaintiff

cites several cases and authorities for the proposition
that there are in fact two separate causes of action
or torts.
The case of Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods,
538 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1975), does nothing more than state
in the introductory paragraph that the plaintiff had
sued Zinikfs for false arrest, false imprisonment and
malicious prosecution.

No distinction is drawn by the

Court between the various causes of action.
The case of Thompson v. General Finance Co.,
468 P.2d 269 (Kan. 1970), simply uses fche terms "false
arrest" and "false imprisonment" interchangeably

and

the Opinion makes it clear that the Kansas Supreme
Court was only talking about one "wrong" or "tort".
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The issue considered by the Court was simply the distinctions between false arrest and malicious prosecution.
The "distinction between the two" which was
supposedly made in McGlone v. Landreth, 195 P.2d 268
(Okla. 1948), was simply that "in a false arrest, false
imprisonment exists, but the detention is by reason of
an asserted legal authority to enforce the processes
of the law; in a false imprisonment, the detention is
purely a matter between private persons for a private
end . . . "

The "distinction" referred to is a direct

quote from 22 AmJur, False Imprisonmentf Section 3,
Appellant did not set forth the entire quote from
22 AmJur; the preamble to that quoted portion states:

As is seen from the definitions, false
arrest and false imprisonment as causes
of action are indistinguishable. The
only distinction lies in the manner in
which they arise. (Emphasis added.)

None of the authorities cited by Appellant stand for the
proposition that a claim for false arrest is not governed
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by a Statute of Limitations similar to Section 78-1229, Utah Code Ann.

No case has been located by counsel

for Respondents which stands for such a proposition, or
even infers that there is such a distinction.
The tort of false imprisonmeht was first defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Smiih v. Clark, 106
Pac. 653 (Utah 1910).

In an Opinion written by Chief

Justice Straup it was noted:

False imprisonment is the unlawful
arrest and detention of the person of
another, with or without a warrant or
other process. It consists in an unlawful restraint upon a man l s person,
or control over the freedom of his
movement, by force or threats . • .
The actual detention of the person,
and the unlawfulness thereof, constitute the trespass; the gravaman being
the unlawfulness of the imprisonment
or the detention.

Appellant cites the case of Hepworth v. Covey
Bros. Amusement Co., 91 P.2d 507, 97 Utah 205 (1939) as
being the "leading Utah case on the distinction existing
between false arrest and false imprisonment".
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In Hepworth

the plaintiff was at a dancehall in the company of two
other young men, one of them a minor.

While sitting

in the lounge they were confronted by two "floor-walkers"
employed by the defendant.

The floor-walkers demanded

that the plaintiff and his friends accompany them to
an office and they "booked" them for possession of
liquor.

Upon the trial of the case the plaintiff obtained

a verdict•

On appeal the defendant quarreled with some

of the instructions given to the jury.

The defendant

had requested instructions emphasizing the elements of
an "arrest".

As noted by the Supreme Court, the implica-

tion was that "if the officer did not intend to arrest
Hepworth, then the latter is not entitled to recover".
The Court noted that the true issue was not whether the
officer had intended to "arrest" the plaintiff, but
whether there was in fact a false imprisonment, that is,
whether by an exercise of force, express or implied, the
plaintiff had been deprived of his liberty and compelled
to go where he did not want to, that is, to accompany
the floor-walkers to the office.
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The Court noted that it

was immaterial to the issue of whether the defendant
had committed the tort of false imprisonment

whether

the defendant's employee had in fact intended to
"arrest".

The Court noted that if "thle officer's

acts and words were such as to reasonably create in
Hepworth's mind the belief of a necessity of conforming
to those demands or suffer the consequences, and
Hepworth conformed rather than to change the consequences, he was restrained of his liberty-

Call the

acts and words of the officer what you may —
or not —

an arrest

the restraint was just as effective*

The

jury might well believed from the facts that Hepworth1s
liberty was restrained quite aside fro^i whether or not
they believe the officer intended making an arrest."
The Court then draws the usual, and proper, distinction
between false arrest and false imprisonment, making it
clear that there is but one tort, that of false imprisonment, and that it may be committed with or without a
false "arrest".

The only difference is that false

arrest is merely one method by which one may commit

11

the tort of false imprisonment.
False arrest and false imprisonment as causes
of action are indistinguishable and the only distinction
lies in the manner in which they arise, Alsup v. Skaggs
Drug Center, 223 P.2d 530 (Okla. 1950), Harrer v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 221 P.2d 428, 124 Mont. 295,
Holland v. Lutz, 401 P.2d 1015 (Kan. 1965)•
False arrest and false imprisonment are essentially synonymous and may be defined as the detention of
a person without his consent and without lawful authority,
Slade v. City of Phoenix, 541 P.2d 550 (Ariz. 1975),
Kaufman v. Brown, 209 P.2d 156, 93 Cal.App.2d 508.
If one looks in AmJur2d under the heading of
"False Arrest", the only notation found thereunder are
the words "see false imprisonment".
In 32 AmJur2d, False Imprisonment,Sections 1
and 2, page 74, false imprisonment is defined as the
unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty
of another.

With regard to the distinction between false

arrest and false imprisonment, it is noted in AmJur that
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False arrest and false imprisonment
as causes of action are said to be
distinguishable only in terminology.
The difference between them lies in
the manner in which they arise.

The Restatement of Torts, Second, Sections 35-45,
defines the tort in terms of "the interest in freedom
from confinement".

The Restatement sets forth many

examples of conduct which would give rise to liability,
including cases where the actor confines the plaintiff
in a room, digs a pit into which he might fall,
threatens him with bodily harm if he does not stay in
one particular place, or purports to arrest.

No distinc-

tion is drawn between "false arrest" and "false imprisonment".

The Restatement makes it clear that the only

distinction is in the manner in which the tort of false
imprisonment is accomplished.
The last Utah Supreme Court case found which
discusses false imprisonment in detail is Mildon v.
Bybee, 375 P.2d 458, 13 Utah 2d 400 (1962).

The Court

there simply noted that "false imprisonment occurs whenever
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there is an unlawful detention or restraint of another
against his will".

The Court makes reference to Section

76-21-1, Utah Code Ann., which simply defined the crime
of false imprisonment as being "the unlawful violation
of the personal liberty of another".

No distinction

Was drawn between false arrest and false imprisonment.
As is apparent from the foregoing analysis,
there is in fact no substantive distinction between
false arrest and false imprisonment.
tort, that of false imprisonment.

There is but one

If the false imprison-

ment is accomplished by who purports to take the other
into custody pursuant to some type of legal authority,
then the tort is oftentimes referred to as "false arrest".
There are no cases which stand for the proposition propounded by Appellant, that is, that there are
two separate torts and thus a one year Statute of Limitations for false imprisonment and a four year Statute
of Limitations for false arrest.
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POINT III. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
HAD EXPIRED BY THE TIME THE APPELLANT
FILED HIS COMPLAINT.
On page 14 of Appellant's Brief it is
asserted, without authority, that the claim in this
case did not accrue until the conclusion of the
criminal case, at which time the plaintiff herein
was acquitted of the crime of shoplifting.

Concededly

the plaintiff was acquitted in February, 1975, and
the action was filed in December, 1975.

If in fact

the cause of action did not arise until February of
1975, then the Complaint was timely filed.

Such,

however, is not the law, the authorities consistently
holding that the cause of action for false imprisonment
arises at the time the imprisonment terminates and
not from the time when the proceedings under which the
plaintiff's arrest occurred ended*

32 AmJur2d, False

Imprisonment, Section 84, page 141; Alexander v.
Thompson, 195 Fed. 31 (CA 6th, Mich.); feackler v. Miller,
79 Neb. 206, 112 NW 303; Oosterwyk v. Bucholtz, 27 NW2d
361, 250 Wis. 521.
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A cause of action for false imprisonment
accrues upon the discharge from imprisonment even
though legal proceedings under the arrest have not
yet terminated, Belflower v. Blackshere, 281 P.2d
423 (Okla. 1955).

A collection of cases setting

forth the same rule is found in 4 9 ALR 2d 922.
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT WAS
CORRECT IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
Appellant contends that the Lower Court
erred because Rule 9(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in part that a party who pleads the
statute must specify the statute relied upon and
may allege generally that the cause of action is
barred by the provisions of that statute.

The last

sentence of the rule provides:

If such allegation is controverted,
the party pleading the statute must
establish, on the trial, the facts
showing that the cause of action
is so barred.
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The problem with Appellant's argument is
that the allegation was not controverted.

It was

stipulated that the plaintiff!s claim was solely
for false arrest and occurred more thdn one year
prior to the filing of the Conplaint.

Under such

circumstances the Court was fully justified, and
in fact required, by Rule 56(c) to rule in favor
of the defendants when the pleadings, Repositions
and admissions on file showed that "there (was) no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party (was) entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law",
CONCLUSION
1.

The plaintiff slept on h;Ls rights and

did not file his Complaint until more than one year
had elapsed.
2.

The plaintiff's claim is for false

arrest or imprisonment and is barred by the Statute
of Limitations.
3.

There is no distinction between false
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arrest and false imprisonment which would justify the
application of any Statute of Limitations other than
Section 78-12-29, Utah Code Ann. (1953).
4.

The ruling of the Trial Court was cor-

rect.
It is respectfully submitted that the granting of Summary Judgment in favor of Defendants and
against the plaintiff should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/ T~

day of

September, 1976.

WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN

By

t U \

/ Cj

Allan L. LarsoJ
Attorneys for defendants
and Respondents
700 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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I hereby certify that a-^opy* of the foregoing Brief of Respondents was mailed to M. Dayle
Jeffs of Jeffs and Jeffs at 90 North l6o East, P. 0.
Box 683, Provo, Utah 84601, by placing a copy of
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